JFK (RID OF CIA) Copies of NSAMs 55, 56, and 57

Appendix E

Copies of NSAMs 55, 56, and 57

Contained herein are copies of National Security Action Memorandum Numbers 55, 56, and 57 taken from Fletcher's own files when working in the Pentagon. As was his standard operating procedure, he xeroxed and saved copies of these for his own files at the point when he briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on them (see page 170).

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NSAM No. 55

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THE  WHITE  HOUSE
                                       WASHINGTON

June 28, 1961                                           

 

 

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 55 TO: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff     SUBJECT:  Relations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President in Cold War Operations

I wish to inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff as follows with regard to my views of their relations to me in Cold War Operations:     a.  I regard the Joint Chiefs of Staff as my principal military advisor responsible both for initiating advice to me and for res- ponding to requests for advice. I expect their advice to come to me direct and unfiltered.     b.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff have a responsibility for the defense of the nation in the Cold War similar to that which they have in con- ventional hostilities. They should know the military and paramilitary forces and resources available to the Department of Defense, verify their readiness, report on their accuracy, and make appropriate recommen- dations for their expansion and improvement. I look to the Chiefs to contribute dynamic and imaginative leadership in contributing to the success of the military and paramilitary aspects of Cold War programs.     c.  I expect the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present the military view- point in governmental councils in such a way as to assure that the military factors are clearly understood before decisions are reached. When only the Chairman or a single Chief is present, that officer must represent the Chiefs as a body, taking such preliminary and subsequent actions as may be necessary to assure that he does in fact represent the corporate judgement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. - 2 -     d.  While I look to the Chiefs to represent the military factor with- out reserve or hesitation, I regard them to be more than military men and expect their help in fitting military requirements into the over-all context of any situation, recognizing that the most difficult problem in Government is to combine all assets in a unified, effective pattern.     [signature of John Kennedy]                                     cc:   Secretary of Defense General Taylor

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NSAM No. 56

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THE  WHITE  HOUSE
                                       WASHINGTON

June 28, 1961                                           

 

 

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 56 TO: The Secretary of Defense     SUBJECT:  Evaluation of Paramilitary Requirements The President has approved the following paragraph: "It is important that we anticipate now our possible future requirements in the field of unconventional warfare and paramilitary operations. A first step would be to inventory the paramilitary assests we have in the United States Armed Forces, consider various areas in the world where the implementation of our policy may require indigenous para- military forces, and thus arrive at a determination of the goals which we should set in this field. Having determined the assets and the possible requirements, it would then be- come a matter of developing a plan to meet the deficit." The President requests that the Secretary of Defense, in coordina- tion with the Department of State and the CIA, make such an estimate of requirements and recommend ways and means to meet these requirements.   McGeorge Bundy                           cc:   Secretary of State Director, CIA General Maxwell D. Taylor   C-O-P-Y

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NSAM No. 57

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C O P Y

 

June 28, 1961                                           

 

 

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 57 TO: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director, CIA The President has approved the attached recommendation: The Special Group (5412 Committee) will perform the functions assigned in the recommendation to the Strategic Resources Group.     McGeorge Bundy                                  cc:   General Maxwell D. Taylor   cc:   Mrs. Lincoln Mr. Smith Mr. McG. Bundy file         C O P Y C O P Y                 RESPONSIBILITY FOR PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS             1.  For the purpose of this study, a paramilitary operation is considered to be one which by its tactics and its requirements in military-type personnel, equipment and training approximates a con- ventional military operation. It may be undertaken in support of an existing government friendly to the U.S. or in support of a rebel group seeking to overthrow a government hostile to us. The U.S. may render assistance to such operations overtly, covertly or by a combination of both methods. In size these operations may vary from the infiltration of a squad of guerillas to a military operation such as the Cuban invasion. The small operations will often fall completely within the normal capa- bility of one agency; the large ones may affect State, Defense, CIA, USIA and possibly other departments and agencies.           2.  In order to conduct paramilitary operations with maximum effec- tiveness and flexibility within the context of the Cold War, it is recommended that current directives and procedures be modified to effect the following:        a.  Any proposed paramilitary operation in the concept state will be presented to the Strategic Resources Group for initial con- sidertation and for approval as necessary by the President. There- after, the SRG will assign primary responsibility for planning, for interdepartment coordination and for execution to the Task Force, department or individual best qualified to carry forward the operation to success, and will indicate supporting responsibilities. Under this principle, the Department of Defense will normally receive responsibility for overt paramilitary operations. Where such an operation is to be wholly covert or disavowable, it may be assigned to CIA, provided that it is within the normal capabilities of the agency. Any large paramilitary operation wholly or partly covert which requires significant numbers of military trained personnel, amounts to military equipment which exceed normal CIA-controlled stocks and/or military experience of a kind and level peculiar to the Armed services is properly the primary responsibility of the Department of Defense with the CIA in a supporting role.